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An Exploratory Analysis of Counterfeiting Strategies: 




Purpose: To identify strategies employed by product counterfeiters in their exploitation of legitimate 
supply chains; to develop a theoretical understanding of counterfeiting and its impact on competitive 
resources; and, to propose counter-measures for increasing the resilience of supply chains to the 
counterfeiting threat. 
Design/methodology/approach: An inductive, qualitative analysis of secondary case data obtained from 
three sources.  
Findings: Initial searching and coding identified four sets of strategies: extraction strategies, for obtaining 
products or materials from the legitimate economy; production strategies, for manufacturing counterfeit 
goods; distribution strategies; and, infiltration strategies, for introducing counterfeits into the legitimate 
economy. Secondary, focused coding revealed that much of what the counterfeiting strategies set out to 
achieve involves the generation, suppression or exploitation of signals. A theoretical account of 
counterfeiting and its impact on competitive resources (quality, reputation and trademark) is then 
developed based on signaling theory and the resource-based view. 
Research implications: A set of counter-measures for dealing with the counterfeiting threat are 
proposed. There is scope for much further work on counterfeit-resilience, including on establishing the 
effectiveness of these counter-measures. 
Practical implications: Counterfeiting is an increasingly significant supply chain problem. It provides a 
direct economic challenge to legitimate producers, undermines the value of trademarks, and threatens 
consumer welfare. It affects many industries, including automotives, aerospace and pharmaceuticals, 
where counterfeits have sometimes proven fatal. The paper adds to our understanding of how this 
phenomenon takes place and how it might be tackled. 
Originality/value: Although many OM studies refer to the risks of patent and copyright infringements 
that arise in supply chains, the problem of product counterfeiting has received only limited attention, 
leaving a clear gap in our understanding. 
 
Keywords:  Supply chain; Counterfeiting; Resilience; Secondary data; Signaling theory. 





1.1 The Counterfeiting Threat 
Counterfeiting is a significant problem evident in a wide range of industries and supply chain 
echelons. This includes in pharmaceuticals, automotives, electronics, and aerospace, where there 
is high reliance on Research & Development (R&D) and innovation. Counterfeit activity is 
increasingly widespread and sophisticated. As described in the many trade publications (e.g. 
Whitehead, 2003; Wald & Holleran, 2007; Sangani, 2010), counterfeiters may construct complex 
supply chains and, using cutting-edge technology, bypass years of investment by reverse-
engineering a new product before mass producing it to profiteer on the back of a brand name or 
marketing campaign. On occasions, counterfeiters have used the same technologies and 
suppliers, and even employed from the same labour pool as Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs) to access tacit knowledge (e.g. Haley, 2003; Trott & Hoecht, 2007). 
The economic and social impact of counterfeiting is considerable. While the size of the 
problem is difficult to gauge, because much counterfeit activity goes undetected or unreported, 
the Counterfeit Intelligence Bureau (CIB) has estimated that counterfeiting represents 5-7% of 
world trade (CIB, 2011). Counterfeiting increases law enforcement costs, reduces tax revenues, 
funds organised crime and terrorism, undermines reputations, and damages customer-confidence. 
It even kills: the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition reported that substandard counterfeit 
shear bolts and sleeves were implicated in an air disaster involving a Norwegian plane which 
killed 55 people (IACC, 2005; see also Luedeman, 1997). Furthermore, media reports suggest 
that approximately 15% of pharmaceuticals imported into the U.S. are counterfeits containing 
unapproved substances (Lister, 2006). Meanwhile, in developing countries, thousands of patients 
are thought to have died from counterfeit medicine in recent years (Lister, 2006).  
Despite interest from practitioners and the popular press, counterfeiting has received only 
limited attention in the academic Operations Management (OM) literature (e.g. Marucheck et al., 
2011b). OM researchers have been concerned with Intellectual Property (IP) risks and the 
appropriation – usually by suppliers – of expert knowledge (e.g. Choi et al., 2004; Chopra & 
Sodhi, 2004), but this typically relates to patent and copyright infringement not trademark 
infringement and passing-off goods as those of another producer, which is the defining aspect of 
counterfeiting. Even in the wider business and management literature, research into supply-side 
counterfeit issues – including how counterfeiters exploit legitimate supply chains – is lacking 
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compared with work on the consumption of counterfeits (Staake et al., 2009). A paper in the risk 
field (Busby & Stevenson, 2011) and Staake et al.’s own recent work (Staake et al., 2012) are 
exceptions. 
In this paper, we present a qualitative, exploratory analysis of secondary data to identify the 
strategies adopted by counterfeiters to exploit legitimate supply chains. We use this as a basis for 
developing a theoretical understanding of counterfeiting and its impact on competitive resources. 
We then propose counter-measures for improving the counterfeit-resilience of supply chains to 
the strategies employed by counterfeiters. We suggest that it is just as important to develop 
resilience to counterfeiting as it is to develop resilience to natural disasters, terrorist attacks and 
other fundamental threats to supply chains (e.g. Christopher & Peck, 2004; Sheffi, 2007; 
Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009; Bakshi & Kleindorfer, 2009). We therefore extend the notion of 
resilience in the OM literature – from the ability to cope, recover or maintain continuity when 
faced with vulnerabilities or disruptions to operations (e.g. Christopher & Peck, 2004; Sheffi, 
2007) – to include threats posed by counterfeiting. 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews several selected 
streams of OM literature to which the counterfeiting threat could be an important consideration. 
We show how this literature deals extensively with the appropriation of expertise and both patent 
and copyright infringement but not with the appropriation of reputation. Section 3 outlines the 
research method adopted before the results of our secondary data analysis are presented in 
Section 4. Here, we categorise the counterfeiting strategies that could be identified from our data 
set, and we show how central to such strategies is the concept of signaling and its impact on 
reputational resources. Section 5 develops a theoretical view of counterfeiting based on a 
combination of signaling theory and the resource-based view. Section 6 proposes counter-
measures to the identified counterfeiting strategies, particularly in the light of the relevance of 
signaling, before the paper concludes with Section 7. Before reviewing the literature, we first 
offer a definition of counterfeiting and explain its fundamental connection with supply chains as 
a form of organisation. 
 
1.2 Counterfeiting, Trademark and Supply Chains 
We distinguish counterfeiting from other intellectual property rights violations, such as patent 
and copyright infringement, where a concept or design is copied but not necessarily with the 




Counterfeiting is the infringement of trademark and the act of passing a product off 
as though it were another’s. 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO, 2014) similarly defined counterfeiting as the 
“unauthorized representation of a registered trademark carried on goods identical to or similar to 
goods for which the trademark is registered, with a view to deceiving the purchaser into 
believing that he/she is buying the original goods”. But in some circumstances, counterfeits are 
procured knowingly so our definition is intended to be slightly wider than the WTO’s. Our 
definition also differs in minor respects from others in the literature (e.g. Yang et al., 2004; 
Staake et al., 2009), but all are based on the central idea that counterfeiting is a deception that 
some product comes from another, more reputable source. 
The concept of counterfeiting as an infringement of trademark is important to the operation of 
supply chains. A trademark is a device, protected in law, that helps remedy a market failure 
(Ramello, 2006) arising from the problem that a buyer typically knows far less about a product's 
quality than the supplier. This asymmetry leads to buyer uncertainty, adds to buyer search costs, 
creates incentives for suppliers to mislead buyers, and results in an overall fall in product quality 
and market size (Akerlof, 1970). Trademarks help overcome such uncertainties by intimately 
associating a good with a reputable producer. They provide the ‘glue’ that avoids opportunistic 
behaviour on the part of one firm supplying another. Not only can customers choose suppliers 
with reputable trademarks, but suppliers also have a strong incentive to maintain their 
trademark’s reputation through the strict management of quality (Ramello, 2006). Trademarks 
thus become an important prerequisite for supply chains – for having confidence in the division 
of labour across multiple firms and regions. Counterfeiting is a threat to legitimate supply chains 
not only by creating unfair economic competition but by undermining the reputational messages 
that a supply chain may depend upon.   
 
2. Literature Review 
In this section we briefly and selectively review the OM literature to support our argument that, 
while it has been concerned with certain problems of IP management in supply chains, this 
almost exclusively concerns the appropriation of expertise via patent and copyright infringement 
rather than the appropriation of reputation – the central aspect of counterfeiting. We then 





2.1 Overview of Selected OM Literature 
The threat of product counterfeiting should be an important consideration when choosing 
suppliers. But while the supplier selection literature considers criterion like trustworthiness 
(Ireland & Webb, 2007) and the risks of suppliers either exploiting production knowledge to 
compete with their former customers (Quinn & Hilmer, 1994; Neiger et al., 2009) or 
‘disintermediate’ in the aftermarket for replacement parts (Rossetti & Choi, 2008), it does not 
explicitly consider, for example, the risk of suppliers passing-off goods under the OEM’s 
trademark. There is a similar emphasis on knowledge appropriation in the supplier integration 
literature. For example, it is noted that integrating suppliers in new product development can lead 
to undesirable knowledge transfers if governance mechanisms fail (Das et al., 2006) and a 
blurring of IP ownership boundaries (e.g. Handfield et al., 1999; Petersen et al., 2005; Parker et 
al., 2008). Research has also attempted to identify the appropriate degree of supplier 
involvement in product development (e.g. Wynstra & ten Pierick, 2000; Parker et al., 2008) and 
strategies for ensuring no external stakeholder has a complete picture of a producer’s product or 
process (e.g. van Hoek & Weken, 1998; Jacobs et al., 2007). But this work says little about how 
supplier integration might facilitate counterfeiting, or how this risk could be managed. 
Work on product traceability, and the technologies that can achieve it, have an obvious 
relevance to counterfeiting. For example, the use of RFID has been advocated as a way of 
protecting pharmaceutical supply chains from counterfeiting (Visich et al., 2009, citing the Food 
and Drug Administration: FDA, 2004; Marucheck et al., 2011b). Meanwhile, there are two 
important End-Of-Life (EOL) issues connected to counterfeiting. First, when a specific product 
is disposed of, it may be recovered by counterfeiters, remanufactured and passed off ‘as-new’, 
with or without restoration. Closed-loop supply chain management – whereby products are 
recovered by OEMs or third parties for remanufacture or disposal (e.g. Kleindorfer et al., 2005; 
French & LaForge, 2006) – provides one potential way of avoiding this. But most research in this 
area is motivated by waste reduction and environmental concerns, not the threat of 
counterfeiting. Second, at the end of a product type’s life, when a manufacturer discontinues 
production, demand for replacements may continue, and counterfeiters may step in and fulfil 
demand with imitations or remanufactured EOL products. But literature in this area does not 
appear to consider the opportunities created for counterfeiters by product discontinuation. 
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Off-shore outsourcing and captive offshoring also have a clear connection with the 
counterfeiting threat. Both introduce physical distance that reduces observability, making the 
supply chain ripe for opportunistic behaviour (Ellram et al., 2008) – including IP theft (Chopra 
& Sodhi, 2004; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). In the case of offshore outsourcing, the literature 
acknowledges that opportunistic behaviour is a particular danger to innovation-oriented firms, 
which are at risk of technology appropriation (Rossetti & Choi, 2008) and transfer to ‘pirate’ 
suppliers (Spekman et al., 2002) who sell to companies that then compete against the legitimate 
producer (Wathne & Heide, 2000). Potential remedies include ‘out-tasking’ (Fine, 1998; 
Takeishi, 2001), whereby a firm outsources a task but does not transfer knowledge of the 
process. Captive off-shoring, like outsourcing, has been linked to knowledge transfer and IP 
concerns. Klassen & Whybark (1994), for example, highlighted the importance of patent 
protection as an integrated international manufacturing network emerges and as employees and 
skills become increasingly transient. One suggestion for reducing risk is to disperse IP-producing 
activity across locations, so the value of IP in any one location is not clear until combined with 
complementary knowledge held in other locations (Zhao, 2006). But in the literature, the primary 
concern is with the leakage of knowledge and expertise. Counterfeiting – and the appropriation 
of reputation – is a quite different, if sometimes related, threat. It is not at all clear that strategies 
conferring resilience to the former – like the dispersal of R&D and the out-tasking of operations 
– would necessarily confer resilience to the latter.  
There has been some recent work, and in particular a special issue of the Journal of 
Operations Management (Marucheck et al., 2011a), on product safety and security in global 
supply chains. Two of the five special issue papers made no reference to counterfeiting (de 
Koster et al., 2011; Hora et al., 2011), and two on supply chain security made only passing 
reference (Gray et al., 2011; Speier et al., 2011). But Marucheck et al. (2011b), focussing on five 
specific industries, identified counterfeiting as a particular threat for pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices. They identified a number of contributory factors, including the Internet, 
outsourcing and the trade in generics, and suggested various remedies (including the use of 
RFID). Nonetheless, their coverage of counterfeiting phenomena specifically was constrained 
and, since their focus was not on counterfeiting exclusively, their theoretical development of it 
was necessarily limited. Our claim is therefore that there remains a need for a systematic study of 
how counterfeiting exploits and threatens legitimate supply chains. In Table I, we synthesise our 
observations on the literature, listing the expertise appropriation threats that have been identified 
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with examples of related reputation appropriation threats that have not been studied but which 
are evident from recent counterfeiting cases. This gap prompts important normative and practical 
questions, e.g. about how best to detect, deter, or prevent counterfeiting. But we first need to 
understand the nature of counterfeiting itself: the strategies that counterfeiters employ, and how 
such strategies are incentivised and facilitated. Only then does it make sense to work out how to 
make supply chains resilient to counterfeiting. Our research question (RQ) is therefore:  
 
RQ:  What strategies can be identified that are employed by product counterfeiters to exploit 
legitimate supply chains? And how can supply chains become more resilient to the 
counterfeiting threat? 
 
[Take in Table I] 
 
3. Research Method 
 
3.1 Research Design 
The research design has three main elements. First, it is qualitative and grounded, suiting the 
nascent state of theory surrounding the phenomenon (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). The aim 
is theory building, not theory confirmation. Second, it uses a case study method, which is 
appropriate for early, exploratory investigation of a phenomenon that is not well understood, 
with variables that are still unknown (Benbasat et al., 1987; Voss, 2009). The case study method 
is also appropriate when the interest is in the dynamics present within specific settings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) and there is no opportunity for experimental control or manipulation 
(Benbasat et al., 1987). Third, the design uses secondary case data. This reflects the difficulties 
of studying a clandestine, criminal activity at first-hand. OM researchers have recently been 
encouraged to make greater use of archival and secondary data (e.g. Calantone & Vickery, 
2010), while grounded theory development based on existing case data has been advocated by 
Lewis (1998). 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
Three sources of secondary case data have been used: (i) cases published by the Counterfeit 
Intelligence Bureau (CIB), a division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC); (ii) 
press releases on counterfeiting cases from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and, 
(iii) news articles on counterfeiting in broadsheet newspapers, indexed by Nexis (NEX). These 
sources provide sufficient data in many cases to identify counterfeiters’ strategies in context. But 
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each has specific limitations and biases. First, CIB reports are vulnerable to industry bias, 
presenting counterfeiting in a way that suits the CIB’s commercial interests and lobbying 
concerns. Second, FBI reports are vulnerable to enforcement bias, presenting counterfeiting in a 
way that conforms to agency policy and is constrained by legal concerns. Third, news articles are 
vulnerable to journalistic bias, presenting counterfeiting in a sensationalised way that reflects the 
need to sell newspapers. By pooling data from the three sources, industry, enforcement and 
journalistic viewpoints are all represented and we aim to avoid an overall analysis that is unduly 
biased. Moreover, the sources are only used to analyse the nature of counterfeiting activity, not 
to make quantitative inferences about the frequency of its occurrence. This is consistent with the 
basic notion that the data, in grounded analysis, are there to stimulate qualitative insight rather 
than measure specific variables, and that qualitative methods are about coming ‘to terms with the 
meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social 
world’ (van Maanen, 1983). Of course an important general limitation of the data is that it is 
inherently confined to cases of counterfeiting that have been both detected and reported. This 
introduces an obvious bias, in that those strategies that are most successful at defying detection, 
or at causing embarrassment to corporations or the authorities, will be the ones least well 
represented in our sample. The remainder of the article needs to be read with this in mind. 
The CIB database contains a large number of reports of which only a proportion describe 
specific cases of counterfeiting. A search within “all industries and countries” was conducted to 
retrieve the latest 50 reports for each of 10 categories of impact (e.g. fatalities, loss of 
employment, poor product quality, etc). This was undertaken on two dates (three months apart) 
to determine the stability of the dataset. This returned 527 reports (27 from the first date were not 
retrieved on the second), reduced to 362 non-duplicates and – after close inspection – to 71 that 
referred at least in part to a specific case. The FBI dataset was queried using “counterfeit” as the 
search term, producing 525 reports which were reduced to just 30 that referred at least in part to 
a specific case. The same approach was adopted with the Nexis database; searching for 
“counterfeit” returned 230 articles, reduced to 26 usable cases. Table II summarises the sampling 
process resulting in 127 useable cases and Table III indicates which industries are represented.  
 
[Take in Tables II & III] 
 
3.3 Analysis Procedure 
Analysis of the case reports followed the principles of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
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Kaufmann & Denk, 2011) rather than content analysis (Weber, 1990). This reflected our 
exploratory rather than confirmatory objective, and allowed important nuances and qualitative 
distinctions in counterfeiting strategies to emerge. This involved two stages, as is typical of 
qualitative analysis: an initial searching and coding stage followed by secondary ‘focused’ 
coding (Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 1983). 
 
3.3.1 Stage 1 – Initial Searching and Coding 
Each case in the final sample was read by one researcher to identify counterfeiters’ strategies and 
the goals to which they were directed. A ‘strategy’ was defined as a pattern of activity that was: 
(i) chosen, not automatic or forced; (ii) coherent, systematic and apparently goal-directed; (iii) 
having some generality, i.e. not specific to a narrow product type; and, (iv) concrete, i.e. a 
particular way of doing something rather than a broad policy. An attempt was made to 
paraphrase the strategies and characterise the goals that the strategies served, e.g. minimising 
detection or prosecution risk. Inferring goals in this way recognised that counterfeiters are goal-
directed actors, and also reflected the notion that the researcher’s core problem is to grasp or 
understand the meanings that actions and events have for those engaged in them (Emerson, 
1983). 
The strategies and goals were then organised into a category system constructed from a 
reading of the data by the process of ‘constant comparison’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). A second 
researcher read the cases, strategies, goals and categorisations of the first researcher and any 
unclear or problematic analysis was resolved by discussion. As Glaser (1964) argued, the 
procedure is not designed to guarantee that two analysts working independently with the same 
data will achieve the same results, but ‘to allow, with discipline, for some of the vagueness and 
flexibility that aid creative generation of theory'. We present the initial categories with 
explanations and examples in Section 4.1. 
 
3.3.2 Stage 2 –Secondary Focused Coding 
The second stage of the analysis sought to find a coding for the data that expressed a deeper and 
more abstract understanding. In Section 4.2, we will argue that signaling is an important aspect 
to the cases that cuts across the initial coding and forms the basis of a further coding scheme, and 
of our theory building in Section 5. This process is inevitably subjective but, as Weber (1990) 
explained, it is a mistake to believe naively that texts of any kind speak for themselves. The 
important step is to make any inferences evident through clear description and explication. Thus, 
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our approach is to present categories and basic distinctions, and then explicate these with the 
data. Staake et al. (2012) demonstrated how data about counterfeiter’s strategies can be analysed 
using more objective methods – in their case, cluster analysis. The primary advantage of a more 
subjective analysis is that we can find underlying connections that are not present in the data at a 
literal level. Our data do not refer to signaling, either directly or by synonyms, but in our 
interpretation they nonetheless describe signaling phenomena – a claim we attempt to justify in 
Section 4.2. 
 
4. Results and Findings 
 
4.1 Initial Searching and Coding 
Initial searching and coding produced four main categories: extraction strategies, i.e. strategies 
by which counterfeiters obtained products or materials from the legitimate economy; production 
strategies, for manufacturing counterfeit goods; distribution strategies; and, infiltration 
strategies, for infiltrating counterfeits into the legitimate economy. These categories were 
obtained by induction – they represented a natural grouping of the identified strategies during the 
reading of the data – but also provided a logical partition according to the chronology of 
counterfeit production. They are clearly not mutually exclusive. Figure 1 summarises the 
strategies while the remainder of Section 4.1 discusses each category in turn.  
 
[Take in Figure 1] 
 
4.1.1 Extraction Strategies 
Of those counterfeiters that extracted genuine parts or products from legitimate supply chains, 
three strategies were evident in the data, as summarised in Table IV. First, there was extraction 
by retrieving disposed-of products. In one case, a legitimate drug was recovered after its expiry 
date, re-packaged, and re-injected into the market for sale to unsuspecting consumers. In another 
case, used PCs were recovered, again from disposals, overhauled and remarked to pass them off 
as new, and sold online with counterfeit software. Second, there was extraction by stealing 
genuine parts or products from the supply chain or aftermarket. This included the theft of aircraft 
parts by workers from within a repair operation which were, again, passed off as new. Third, 
there was extraction by obtaining items through legitimate channels, e.g. procuring components 
from unsuspecting upstream supply chain members. For example, some pharmaceutical 
counterfeiters incorporated active ingredients sourced from legitimate suppliers. 
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The various ways in which counterfeiters procure materials from the legitimate economy 
illustrates how counterfeit-resilience should not be exclusively concerned with tackling the 
infiltration of counterfeit products into the legitimate supply chain. It must also deal with the 
inadvertent supply of genuine materials into counterfeiting operations. Counterfeits that are not 
intended to be functional – for example, counterfeit pharmaceuticals intended to have no 
therapeutic effect – require no particular extraction strategy. But counterfeits intended to be 
functional, so that counterfeiters can get repeat sales and avoid detection, do generally need 
materials, components and products of some sophistication from the legitimate economy. 
[Take in Table IV] 
 
4.1.2 Production Strategies 
Some of the production strategies identified (see Table V) were essentially about timing. One, 
for example, involved early market entry that was nearly simultaneous with, or even ahead of, 
the genuine product. Counterfeiters were known to have attended tradeshows and launch events 
to get early information and samples. Another timing-related strategy was to postpone final 
assembly of a product with its counterfeited trademark until close to the final sale, thereby 
avoiding detection and action by the authorities. 
Most of the production strategies in our analysis involved members of legitimate supply 
chains. For example, some cases consisted of production over-runs by a subcontractor to the 
genuine manufacturer. The ordered quantity was supplied to the genuine manufacturer but, 
without authorisation, the subcontractor produced and sold extra output under the manufacturer’s 
trademark. In other cases, subcontractors produced cheaper, near-copies of the original, which 
they passed off as the genuine article. Sometimes, otherwise legitimate suppliers even 
counterfeited their own outputs. In one instance, an aircraft parts producer illicitly subcontracted 
to a cheaper unauthorised producer, before using false paperwork to pass the items off as its own. 
Counterfeit production in other cases involved downstream supply chain members diluting a 
genuine product. This included pharmacists and other intermediaries diluting doses of 
chemotherapy drugs and anti-malarial vaccines.  
These strategies indicate that resilience must involve attention to actors both within and 
outside the supply chain. Counterfeiting as an internal phenomenon is especially problematic 
insofar as supply chain members have privileged access to production technology and 
distribution channels, but it is potentially more controllable with suitable governance 
12 
 
arrangements. As an external phenomenon, counterfeiting is more unlikely to produce exact 
replicas, but it is harder to gain knowledge of, and control over. 
 
[Take in Table V] 
 
4.1.3 Distribution Strategies 
Most distribution strategies that could be identified (see Table VI) were intended to reduce risks 
to counterfeiters. In some cases, counterfeits were shipped via multiple (often free-trade) ports to 
several addresses in target countries in low volumes to limit traceability and the size of a seizure 
if intercepted. Risk was also minimised by being mobile. For example, one operation was 
described as a ‘moving target’, shifting periodically around Asia and South America to remain 
out of reach of prosecutors. In some cases, risk was reduced by obscuring the false trademark 
during transportation – for example, by placing a sticker over the mark which was removed once 
through customs. Another strategy for coping with seizures was simply to over-produce. The 
counterfeiting business model, unlike the legitimate one, is tolerant of high attrition rates. The 
margins on cheap counterfeits are generally so high that counterfeiters accept that many items 
will be seized, knowing enough will slip through to make the activity profitable.  
Only two of the identified strategies were not particularly directed to managing seizure or 
prosecution risk. The first involved ‘bundling’ counterfeit products with genuine items. In one 
case, genuine Nintendo consoles were sold with fake accessories for export from the Far East 
into Europe. Similarly, a genuine medication was bundled with counterfeit inhalers and dosage 
counters. This had more to do with minimising detection by consumers than the authorities, and 
appeared to be mainly intended to facilitate market acceptance of the counterfeits. The second 
strategy, aimed at similar ends, involved using a legitimate service provider or respected 
location. This included shipping products via the U.S. mail, using trusted online services such as 
Paypal, and shipping counterfeits produced in the Far East intended for North America via 
London simply to obtain a plausible postmark. 
 
[Take in Table VI] 
 
4.1.4 Infiltration Strategies 
The first strategy in Table VII involved infiltrating parallel markets to gain or maintain 
anonymity. Pharmaceuticals, for example, are heavily traded in parallel markets, where cheaper 
foreign sales are re-imported and re-packaged with local language instructions. This often 
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involves many dealers and multiple transactions, creating a substantial degree of anonymity. 
Anonymity was also obtained in some cases by infiltrating informal, loosely regulated channels 
such as flea markets. But the most obvious way of gaining anonymity is via Internet trading, and 
this was widely evident in the data. For example, counterfeit aerospace parts (e.g. radar parts, 
valves and gauges) – produced in China and the U.S. – were sold through business-to-business 
and business-to-consumer auction sites. 
Some infiltration strategies involved suborning members of a legitimate supply chain, e.g. 
recruiting otherwise legitimate retailers to sell counterfeits alongside genuine goods. Other 
strategies focused on infiltrating the aftermarket, which typically has fewer procurement controls 
due to its size, dispersed nature and often informal institutions. For example, some cases 
involved independent counterfeiters selling into the automotive aftermarket, often to unlicensed 
mechanics who were presumably much less likely to report counterfeits to the authorities. Other 
cases involved the disintermediation of an OEM. For example, a subcontract spare parts supplier 
to Toyota supplied products branded with the Toyota logo directly to its aftermarket distributors 
without permission. This multiplicity of possibilities for infiltration suggests that resilience to 
counterfeiting needs to have a matching complexity if it is to be successful. 
 
[Take in Table VII] 
 
4.2 Secondary Focused Coding 
In this deeper, secondary coding, the fundamental step was ‘discovering a core category which 
organises the other categories by continually resolving the main concern’ (Glaser, 2002). Our 
core category was signaling: the idea that a common aspect to many of the counterfeiting 
strategies was the use, suppression or exploitation of signals between actors. This extended 
across all categories identified during the initial searching and coding. For example: 
• Extraction strategies, such as recovering end-of-life products, could broadly be attributed to 
cost minimisation goals. But they also served signaling goals. For instance, by using obsolete 
products, counterfeiters avoided signaling their presence in raw material markets and, 
because these products were once genuine, their appearance naturally signalled authenticity 
to customers. 
• Some production strategies involved counterfeiting by manufacturers of legitimate products, 
e.g. over-runs by licensed subcontractors in the garment trade, and the passing-off of branded 
pharmaceuticals by generics manufacturers. This exploited existing facilities to produce 
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counterfeits cheaply, but the lawful activities also falsely signalled to the authorities that the 
physical presence and consumption of materials was legitimate. 
• Distribution strategies were most obviously risk-reducing, but again commonly involved 
signaling. For example, small consignments not only reduced the size of seizures but also 
sent weaker signals to the authorities that consignments were suspicious. Postponing the 
attachment of trademarks to generic products similarly avoided sending suspicious signals to 
the authorities who would be alert to, and could prosecute, only goods falsely carrying 
trademarks. Bundling counterfeit with genuine products also helped to signal authenticity. 
• Infiltration strategies similarly had important functions in relation to signaling. For example, 
using anonymous trading channels, e.g. the Internet, meant counterfeiters avoided signals of 
illegitimacy and transience (like small, unsigned business premises) that would be obvious if 
they had to trade face-to-face. Meanwhile, suborning legitimate supply chain members 
helped signal, misleadingly, to consumers that counterfeits were legitimate. 
 
Hence, although most strategies had a substantive element, they also had a signaling 
function. Viewing them in terms of signals gives additional insight into why counterfeiters use 
them and what significance other actors give to them. This echoes much of what has been seen in 
the signaling literature for over 30 years (since Spence, 1973), which has increasingly seen the 
signaling value of actions that have hitherto been interpreted only in terms of their substantive 
effects (e.g. Certo, 2003; Cohen & Dean, 2005). The next stage was, therefore, to identify the 
signaling elements of the strategies found in the data, and to produce a further set of categories 
for these elements which reflected two basic dimensions:  
1. Actions: What the counterfeiters were doing with respect to a signal, e.g. transmitting a false 
signal or obscuring a true signal. 
2. Objects: What kind of entity or characteristic the signal concerned, e.g. signals about 
counterfeiters’ identities or a product’s quality. 
The remainder of this section describes and tabulates these categories.  
  
4.2.1 Actions: What Counterfeiters were doing with Respect to Signals 
Table VIII lists five types of signaling action implied in the counterfeiting strategies. The 
simplest involved transmitting signals, typically false signals that suggested authenticity, and 
obscuring signals, typically true signals that would have identified products as counterfeit and 
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allowed the counterfeiters to be traced. False signals extended beyond copying a trademark to 
copying other accompanying indicators of quality, e.g. certificates and marks of third-party 
institutions such as the American Petroleum Institute (API).  
 
[Take in Table VIII] 
 
Some strategies involved acting on certain signals, e.g. that there was likely to be strong 
demand for a product that could be counterfeited. Sometimes these were direct market signals, 
e.g. high prices or evidence that a discontinued product was still needed. Other times, they were 
market-relevant signals, e.g. health authority recommendations that citizens procure anti-viral 
medication in anticipation of a pandemic. Heavy demand, to the point of ‘panic buying’, 
suggested not only that legitimate producers might be unable to fulfil short-term demand but that 
consumers might be less attentive to cues that would otherwise identify a product as counterfeit. 
Signals of this kind are loosely defined: they do not involve any particular actor producing a 
signal intended for another – only some situation or institution being in a condition that another 
actor (e.g. a counterfeiter) interprets as a signal. They illustrate how legitimate supply chain 
members need to be conscious not only of the signals they knowingly or unknowingly send 
themselves, but of how counterfeiters can be signalled by situations more generally.  
Occasionally, the counterfeiters’ strategies involved exploiting signals exchanged between 
other actors, or exploiting the absence of such signals. One case described how non-functional 
counterfeit automotive parts had been implicated in accidents, but how the absence of official 
accident investigations meant consumers had not received appropriate warnings. Counterfeiters 
could exploit this absence of a signal by continuing to sell non-functional counterfeits in the 
market. Another case referred to auction websites publicising controls against counterfeits, thus 
suggesting safety to potential consumers. Such controls provide useful signals to consumers, but 
when they were not enforced – as suggested by some of the data – counterfeiters could not only 
use the website but also benefit from the false, misleading safety signal between website and 
consumer.  
Finally, some strategies straightforwardly involved ignoring signals intended for the 
counterfeiter. Such signals were being created deliberately by actors to deal with counterfeiting, 
but were often ineffective. For example, when the counterfeiting ‘business model’ was to trade at 
such a high margin that customs interceptions had no great consequence, counterfeiters could 
afford to ignore the signals that authorities were supposedly sending by making seizures. Signals 
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of this kind have to be designed with care: they should not just be perceived as being costly to 
generate but as being costly to ignore. 
 
4.2.2 Objects: What the Signals Concerned 
The objects of signaling fell into the eleven categories shown in Table IX. Authenticity was 
probably the most important. Counterfeiters attempted to signal that their products were 
authentic not only by reproducing the trademark and packaging but by producing fake 
accompanying documentation and warrants, by bundling counterfeit with genuine products, and 
by using legitimate distributors. Authenticity signals were aimed not only at consumers but at 
genuine producers and the authorities. As well as protecting the counterfeiters directly, they also 
protected complicit buyers who were able to plead ignorance if the counterfeiters had made 
extensive efforts to signal authenticity. Quality signals were often similar to authenticity signals, 
but they were not the same. The example given in Table IX shows those counterfeiters who 
wanted repeat sales had to imitate not just the trademark but also the functionality of a product. 
For example, they had to incorporate the correct active ingredient in a counterfeit 
pharmaceutical. In theory, at least, some consumers may knowingly consume counterfeits for 
which authenticity signals are lacking but quality signals are strong. 
 
[Take in Table IX] 
 
Traceability as an object of signaling was also important, and some counterfeiters’ strategies 
were aimed at suppressing signals that would have allowed their locations and identities to 
become known. For example, Internet trading and dispersing operations over multiple 
jurisdictions helped suppress traceability signals. This was related to organisation as an object of 
signaling. For example, counterfeiters’ production facilities were used for legitimate activity like 
manufacturing own-brand products and generics, so they did not have to hide evidence of an 
organised operation like a factory, supply contracts or shipping movements from the authorities. 
When counterfeiters were extracting materials from legitimate supply chains, destination also 
became a relevant object of signaling. Counterfeiters had to either avoid indicating the actual 
destination of materials to the supplier, or falsely suggest a legitimate destination.  
Counterfeiters’ strategies also involved responding to signals about a market’s accessibility 
(e.g. the increased accessibility of military equipment markets, where buyers are often now 
prepared to procure commercial off-the-shelf products), as well as signals about the presence of 
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demand (e.g. in markets for obsolescent yet vital components). Correspondingly, counterfeiters 
generated signals about the availability of their own products in such markets. They also 
responded to signals about recourse – about how consumers would behave if and when they 
discovered products were counterfeit. For example, counterfeiters could anticipate that 
dissatisfied buyers of non-functional products for potentially embarrassing conditions, like 
erectile dysfunction, would be unlikely to complain. This indicates that legitimate actors are 
vulnerable to exploitation. Finally, jurisdictions and penalties were obvious objects for the 
signals that legitimate groups tried to send to counterfeiters. As with any enforcement activity, 
the signaling that came from acting against counterfeiters was at least as important as the 
substantive outcomes of removing counterfeits from the market. Such signals were not only 
intended to deter counterfeiting but sustain consumers’ trust in the trademark as a reliable signal 
of product quality. Unfortunately, as indicated by the examples in the table, some counterfeiters 
also responded to signals that jurisdictions were incoherent and penalties were weak or 
unenforced. 
 
The clear implication of these findings is that most, if not all, of the strategies exhibited by 
counterfeiters involved signaling in some way. This in turn suggests that achieving counterfeit 
resilience must also involve dealing with signals: discovering and revealing true signals obscured 
by counterfeiters, counteracting and undermining the false signals generated by counterfeiters, 
and recognising the exploitability of signals exchanged in networks of legitimate actors. 
 
5. Theory Development 
The above observations point to the potential of developing a more theoretical understanding of 
counterfeiting in terms of signaling theory, and this will be briefly discussed in Section 5.1. 
However, they also point to the way legitimate producers and counterfeiters are struggling over 
reputation, and how reputation is a valuable resource for them: a resource that the legitimate 
producer wants to preserve and maintain exclusive access to; but also a resource that the 
counterfeiter wants to get access to without completely destroying in the process. Therefore, in 
Section 5.2, we combine signaling theory and the Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm. We 
do this in a purely qualitative way. 
 
5.1 Counterfeiting as a Signaling Phenomenon 
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Signaling is fundamentally a process for dealing with information asymmetries, such as in labour 
markets, where there is uncertainty about quality (Spence, 1973) and liability of newness in some 
form (Certo, 2003). It also explains the need for trademarks, where consumers know less about a 
product’s quality than the producer, especially if the product (but not the producer) is new. The 
possibility of copying a trademark, however, allows counterfeiters to exploit this information 
asymmetry with false signals of provenance. Our findings in Section 4 showed that information 
asymmetry is important not only in relation to attributes like quality and provenance but also to 
the integrity of supply chain members, the capacities of producers to act against counterfeiters, 
and the nature, location and origins of counterfeiters. 
Connelly et al. (2011) presented a review of signaling theory in which they tabulated its key 
constructs, including three that are particularly relevant to counterfeiting. First, the observability 
of signals refers to the fact that any signal has a certain strength (Connelly et al., 2011). For 
example, in the context of counterfeiting, the use of a respected third-party certification may 
send stronger signals to potential customers, but only up to the point at which the certification is 
itself found to be counterfeited. Once the frequency of counterfeit certificates in circulation is 
non-zero, the signals become markedly reduced in strength. Second, the cost of signals, refers to 
the transaction expenses associated with implementing a signal (Connelly et al., 2011). The 
classical analysis of signaling (Spence, 1973) is that either signallers must have a reputation for 
signal reliability or the costs of signaling must be negatively correlated with quality – making it 
too costly for poor quality actors to signal high quality. Since imitating trademarks has very little 
direct cost, the false signaling involved in counterfeiting is always a distinct possibility. The third 
construct is distortion, which refers to noise introduced by the signaling environment, external 
referents, or other signallers (Connelly et al., 2011). In several of our cases, manufacturers 
sometimes appeared to play up the counterfeiting risk to justify exclusive distribution contracts 
with particular wholesalers, but at other times appeared to play down the risk to avoid loss of 
consumer confidence. Their signals to both supply chain partners and consumers could be 
distorted by scepticism about the firms’ motives. And clearly a large part of what counterfeiters 
do is to distort signals – whether this involves obscuring signals that they want to avoid sending 
(such as who they are) or enhancing false signals that their products are authentic. 
 
5.2 Counterfeiting as a Signaling-Resource Phenomenon 
The problem with signaling theory alone is that it says little about what is ultimately at stake: the 
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harm done to the legitimate supply chain and focal producer, and particularly their reputational 
resources. Although signals often concern the value of some entity (e.g. Cohen & Dean, 2005), 
the origins of this value, and what threatens it, do not lie within the ambit of signaling. Thus, to 
develop theory on counterfeiting as a supply chain hazard, we also draw on the RBV (Penrose, 
1959; Rubin, 1973; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) and the notion that sustained competitive 
advantage derives from the valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable resources 
and capabilities that a firm, or supply chain (Ketchen & Hult, 2007), controls. Counterfeiters 
effectively avoid the resource barrier that competitors otherwise face (Wernerfelt, 1984), 
particularly when the imitation is superficial, i.e. with no attempt to make a functional product. 
In addition, counterfeiters control their own advantageous resources, and so have their own 
resource-based rationale in the illegal economy. Resource-based theories therefore become 
important for examining the persistence of counterfeiting organisations as well as the threats they 
pose. Equally, the response to counterfeiting by a legitimate firm may involve enhancing its 
resources. It may make quality improvements and develop dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 
1997) that enable it to adapt its resource base over time (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Barney et 
al., 2001) and make such resources harder to imitate. 
The essential resources concerned in product counterfeiting are: (i) the fundamental resource 
of quality, typically acquired through long experience of production, scientific investigation and 
investment in expertise; (ii) the institutionalised resource of trademark, typically acquired via a 
straightforward legal transaction, but lacking virtually any intrinsic value at inception; and, (iii) 
reputation, typically acquired over a substantial period as consumers increasingly associate their 
experiences of high quality goods with the trademark. All three broadly fall within received 
definitions of ‘resource’ in the RBV. They are consistent with the notion that a resource can be 
intangible as much as tangible, and is in some sense owned, controlled or accessible to an 
organisation on a semi-permanent basis (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). Reputation is a derived 
resource in that it refers to another, more fundamental resource (quality). 
We argue that the key relationship between signaling theory and the RBV is that signaling 
facilitates (or undermines) the development, maintenance and exploitation of certain kinds of 
resource value. Figure 2 outlines how this essentially works, showing a developmental 
relationship between signals and resources over time. The distance between signal symbols 
represents the time density of signals, although in practice they will be more continuous than 
discrete – trademarked goods available in a market continuously emit signals while they are 
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available, and such signals are ‘received’ every time a consumer pays attention to them. Signals 
are exchanged in conditions of information asymmetry, but the extent to which they resolve such 
asymmetry is diminished by noise. 
 
[Take in Figure 2] 
 
The producer in the stylised example in Figure 2 starts with a high quality product (see point 
A in the figure), a trademark (B) but no reputation (C). As Zahra & Filatotchev (2006) pointed 
out, developing new capabilities produces information asymmetry. The trademark signals, 
however, that the producer takes its reputation for quality seriously, that this reputation can be 
protected, and that its products can be unequivocally associated with itself. With experience, 
consumers associate the trademark with high levels of experienced quality, and increasingly it 
becomes a direct signal of product quality. The value of the trademark and reputational resources 
therefore rise accordingly (see D and E, respectively). At a specific time, a counterfeit product 
becomes available and a period of signaling starts in which consumers receive false signals from 
the counterfeiter (e.g. F), counterfeiters obscure signals that could reveal their provenance (G), 
and producers signal to counterfeiters their determination to defend the trademark (H). These 
signals affect the value of the producer’s trademark and reputation resources. 
An advantage of trademark as a signal of product quality is that it does not disclose 
proprietary information that would help a competitor reproduce the same quality (Ndofor & 
Levitas, 2004). A corresponding drawback is that this means it takes time for trademark to be 
associated with high quality goods; and, perhaps more importantly for our analysis, it is easy to 
imitate. The costs of signaling have to be negatively correlated with quality, thus the low cost of 
imitating a trademark means it is important that the legal penalties and probability of 
enforcement are high. But this probability of enforcement itself has to be signalled, both by state 
authorities and producers. Therefore, signals from the state authorities to the counterfeiter (as 
well as from the producer) also become important (I). Similarly, rebuilding the value of 
trademark and reputation resources (points J and K, respectively) after counterfeiting may 
involve substantive actions, such as enhancing quality still further or prosecuting counterfeiters, 
but it will also involve signaling, e.g. to consumers about falling risk, to counterfeiters about 
sanctions, and to other supply chain members not to provide materials to counterfeiters, infiltrate 
counterfeits into the legitimate supply chain, or allow end-of-life streams to be used by 
counterfeiters. Our results in Section 4 give a sense of the variety of signals that are potentially 
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involved in any specific case. 
Finally, although Figure 2 does not show resource value becoming negative, it is possible for 
this to occur (Wernerfelt, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1992). In the case of reputation and trademark, 
a high frequency of publically-known counterfeiting, particularly for safety-critical products, 
could make such reputational resources ‘toxic’. Famous cases of product contamination, e.g. the 
Tylenol case (Dowdell et al., 1992), show how seriously the value of a firm can be undermined 
by loss of confidence in a trademark, and how it can be redeemed by swift, appropriate action 
that signals a firm’s concern for consumer safety (Maak & Pless, 2006). 
 
6 Implications for Counter-Measures 
In this section, we propose a series of counter-measures for enhancing resilience to the 
counterfeiting threat. The counter-measures, as shown in Table X, are organised around the 
counterfeiting strategies identified in Section 4.1 and summarised in Figure 1. They also draw on 
the general notions of signaling developed in Section 5. The subsections that follow explain our 
suggestions and discuss the underlying principles. 
 
[Take in Table X] 
 
6.1 Dealing with Material Flows into the Counterfeiting Process 
All the extraction strategies identified earlier involved the flow of legitimate items into the 
counterfeiting process. Logically, the two counter-strategies are to: (i) interrupt this flow so 
counterfeiters cannot obtain their raw materials and components; and, (ii) render the flow useless 
somehow when used in counterfeit products.  
The first approach is perhaps the most feasible. In the case of counterfeiters obtaining 
materials from end-of-life streams, this requires re-acquisition or assured destruction, which may 
rely on creating a market in returned materials or certificates of destruction. In the case of stolen 
materials, greater security is necessary. And in the case of counterfeiters acquiring materials by 
open procurement, legitimate suppliers must be persuaded to take reasonable precautions against 
inadvertent (or even knowing) sales to counterfeiters. All these actions have important signaling 
aspects. The threatened supply chains must signal the need for product destruction, facilitate the 
destruction process (which itself helps to signal its importance), and signal the dangers of 
supplying counterfeiters. But supply chains also need to avoid inadvertent signaling. For 
example, discontinuing products may signal to counterfeiters that: (a) there may an increased 
22 
 
flow of disposed-of products, which they can recover; and, (b) there will be residual, unfulfilled 
demand for the obsolescent products. 
The second strategy, of rendering materials and products useless, presents fewer opportunities 
and requires more specialised approaches. For example, where counterfeiters modify disposed-of 
items, e.g. changing their ‘sell-by’ date or serial numbers, one response would be to develop 
product markings that are hard to obliterate without destroying the product. It may also be 
possible to find technologies that render an item non-functional, or of changed appearance, when 
removed from its original use. By using legitimate materials and components, counterfeiters not 
only make fake products functional, they also signal legitimate origins – and this signaling needs 
to be counteracted. If markings are hard to obliterate, it becomes difficult for the counterfeiter 
not to signal that a component has been tampered with or used previously.  
 
6.2 Dealing with Agency Failures in the Supply Chain 
Three production strategies involved supply chain actors exploiting their position to counterfeit a 
partner’s product. This reflects an agency failure, and countering it involves enhancing supply 
chain controls, either by agreeing more rigorous controls or enforcing controls more rigorously. 
This does not have to mean punishing suppliers – it could involve incentivising actors so they do 
not exploit their position in the first place. 
Signaling is likely to be a part of any response. Contractual controls, e.g. against production 
over-runs, need to be accompanied by signals that infringements will be detected and acted upon. 
Taking court action is costly to the legitimate producer but signals that counterfeiting is taken 
very seriously. Any costless actions may be attractive but may not have a strong signaling 
function. Also, there is a danger of inadvertent signals indicating that a producer does not take 
counterfeiting seriously. For example, prioritising price may be taken as a signal by a supplier 
that it is legitimate and even expected that they should look for a low-cost subcontractor whose 
products they can pass off as their own.  
 
6.3 Dealing with Early Market Entry of Counterfeits 
One of the production strategies we identified involved early market entry by counterfeiters, who 
exploit intelligence about forthcoming products and launch a counterfeit when demand is high 
and before customers are familiar with the genuine product. The obvious counter-measure is to 
inform customers to expect counterfeits and tell them how to differentiate between counterfeit 
and genuine products. It may be possible for the producer to provide customers with codes, 
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passwords or keys directly so they can authenticate a product. The drawback of this information 
disclosure ahead of a product release is that it may signal to potential customers that they are at 
risk of buying a counterfeit, and thus depress the market. Genuine producers also need to 
consider the signals they unintentionally send to counterfeiters about the opportunities for 
lucrative, and perhaps unfulfilled, demand among naïve consumers ahead of a launch. But in 
practice, it may be difficult to avoid such signals given the need to create a successful market for 
a product. The key is perhaps to recognise the possibility of this inadvertent signaling, and to 
ensure that potential customers receive signals that the risk of inadvertently buying a counterfeit 
can be nullified in some way. 
 
6.4 Dealing with Material Dilution 
Another production strategy for counterfeiters involved diluting a genuine product, e.g. 
pharmaceuticals, beverages or detergents, in order both to: (i) replicate some functionality and 
obtain repeat orders; and, (ii) reduce costs. One counter-measure would be to somehow produce 
a genuine product that clearly indicates when it has been diluted or adulterated in some way, 
perhaps chemically. Another would be to inform consumers about how to distinguish between 
diluted and non-diluted forms, and to warn them of the risks of procuring via informal channels 
that are likely to be inhabited by counterfeiters. 
The problem, from a signaling standpoint, is that issuing warnings may be perceived by 
consumers as an attempt to direct them to channels that are lucrative for the producer – such as 
high-margin retailers. Hence, for a warning signal to be trusted, it needs to be seen as costly to 
generate. This might be self-fulfilling, in the sense that consumers would recognise that a 
producer engaged in such signaling runs the risk of customers defecting to competing products. 
But it might not, and the possibility of defection may of course persuade a legitimate producer 
not to indicate that its products are being counterfeited. 
 
6.5 Dealing with Engineered Credibility 
Two distribution strategies were aimed at creating credibility in the market: bundling counterfeits 
with genuine products, and using legitimate service providers and locations in the final stages of 
distribution. The bundling problem arises because products are not completely self-contained: 
they are bought with accessories or associated products, e.g. specialised hardware and 
accompanying software. Even if one or more bundled components are counterfeit, they may go 
undetected if others are genuine. This could be counteracted by preventing bundling altogether, 
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but this is difficult in an open market and may only be feasible where products are specialised 
and market players known to each other. Distributors might be able, in such circumstances, to 
avoid selling genuine components in suspiciously large volumes that counterfeiters would 
otherwise split up and repackage with counterfeits. Alternatively, consumers could be informed 
so they can detect bundles containing counterfeits.  
Again, however, this runs the risk of producing unintended signals. Informing consumers may 
signal to them that counterfeiting is rife and that they should switch to competing trademarks. 
Alternatively, they may dismiss it as scaremongering aimed at diverting them to official high-
margin distribution and retail channels. The firm may be able to signal the bona fides nature of 
its disclosure by getting a trusted third-party consumer association to make or endorse the 
communication. Meanwhile, asking distributors to avoid high-volume component sales to 
possible counterfeiters may signal to disreputable distributors that they can profit from selling to 
counterfeiters. This all suggests that the best strategy is not simply to act in some predetermined 
way but to calculate the best course of action given the signaling involved in acting.  
 
6.6 Dealing with Unofficial Markets 
Several infiltration strategies were based on unofficial markets, e.g. parallel import markets, flea 
markets, and online markets, including auction sites, where counterfeiters can remain anonymous 
and avoid entry costs. Trading in such markets should itself induce caution to buyers: the very 
fact they are anonymous is a warning. Whether such cues are acted on is debatable, and when 
counterfeits are consumed knowingly, they are counter-productive. In principle, well-known, 
reputable brokers can operate in informal markets – at least on the Internet – but experience 
suggests that their capacity to detect and prohibit counterfeiters trading informally is limited. 
Hence, there is a danger that their reputation, and their promises of strong controls on 
counterfeits and other kinds of fraudulent trading, send reassuring signals that are misleadingly 
optimistic. 
 
6.7 Dealing with Counterfeit Flows into the Legitimate Supply Chain 
The remaining infiltration strategies concerned intra-supply chain problems. Hence, similar 
counter-measures to those needed for dealing with agency failures in the context of production 
strategies apply. Again, costly actions will send strong signals, but these are the least attractive 
actions because they are so costly. A case-by-case judgement on the best actions to follow is 
necessary. Arguably, the importance of signaling grows as supply chains become more extended. 
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For example, in the absence of direct contracts, the signaling implications of actions like creating 
financial incentives for retailers to report intelligence on counterfeiting to a manufacturer 
become more significant. But such schemes could also create incentives for false reporting, or 






This study began with the research question: What strategies can be identified that are employed 
by product counterfeiters to exploit legitimate supply chains? And how can supply chains 
become more resilient to the counterfeiting threat? A range of strategies have been identified 
which are used by counterfeiters to extract materials from the legitimate economy, produce in 
parallel to genuine producers, distribute counterfeits via both criminal and legal networks, and/or 
infiltrate counterfeits into legitimate supply networks. The strategies serve a variety of ends, 
including minimising counterfeiters’ costs and the probability of detection. The strategies also 
widely share a common aspect – that of signaling. They variously generate false signals, 
suppress true signals, and exploit signals intended for others. A set of counter-measures have 
been proposed for dealing with the counterfeiting strategies to help supply chains become more 
resilient to the counterfeiting threat. 
Overall, this paper makes four contributions. First, it provides an introduction to the highly 
topical theme of counterfeiting, which – given its spread to safety-critical products – is of 
increasing societal significance, yet has received only limited attention in the OM literature. 
Second, it reports a two-stage, grounded analysis of how counterfeiting takes place, based on the 
notion of counterfeiters as goal-oriented actors exploiting legitimate supply chains. Third, it 
synthesises signaling theory and the RBV to explain counterfeiting and its impact on competitive 
resources. This responds to the need for a more dynamic view of resources (Helfat & Peteraf, 
2003), illustrating how they are developed and eroded over time in a way that is shaped by 
signaling. Finally, it proposes counter-measures towards improving the counterfeit-resilience of 
supply chains, tracing these to the principles underlying the various counterfeiting strategies 
evident in the secondary cases. Perhaps the most important message of this part of the paper is 




7.1 Practical Implications 
The analysis of counterfeiters’ strategies represents an important step in helping operations 
managers take a structured and methodical approach to dealing with counterfeiting. Managers 
can use the strategies in Figure 1 to anticipate the counterfeiting threats their products and supply 
chains may face, while the counter-measures proposed may help them to respond. The way of 
thinking about counterfeiting illustrated in Figure 2 that can be applied to specific products or 
supply chains is also a potentially important step towards dealing with counterfeits. Such 
analysis shows how counterfeiters are encouraged and discouraged by signals of various kinds; 
and, how legitimate actors contribute to this in the way they generate and receive signals. We 
suggest that there needs to be a systematic analysis of all signaling that goes on around 
counterfeiting – including the ‘mixed signals’ that firms send and the signals that they do not 
intend to send. 
 
7.2 Limitations  
The secondary data we used was originally compiled for purposes other than scholarly research. 
It was therefore vulnerable to the biases of individual compilers and the institutional biases of 
their employers and sponsors. This includes biases of selection (which cases were reported on) 
and of interpretation (which facts were reported and what was made of them). Although we have 
drawn on multiple sources, and avoided quantitative inferences, the data is limited to cases of 
detected counterfeiting – other counterfeiting strategies that go undetected may exist but are not 
captured in Figure 1. Meanwhile, although our approach was highly suited to theory building, it 
does not provide strong theory confirmation. We cannot infer the extent of the phenomena we 
observed or generalise on its relevance to industries not represented in the data.  
 We believe, however, that understanding how counterfeiters exploit legitimate supply chains, 
and how they are influenced by both the deliberate and inadvertent signals generated in those 
supply chains, is an important first step in helping them achieve some measure of resilience to 
what is potentially a fundamental threat to operations in legitimate economies. 
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Table I: A Summary of Threats Cited in the Literature and Related Gaps 
 
Theme Example Threats in the Literature Threats Neglected in the Literature 
 
Supplier Selection 
Suppliers exploiting production 
knowledge to go into business as a 
complete product manufacturer; 
Suppliers counterfeiting their own 
goods by illicitly subcontracting to a 
lower cost producer; 
Suppliers ‘disintermediating’ in the 
aftermarket for replacement parts. 
Suppliers passing-off goods under the 
OEM’s trademark. 
Supplier Integration 
Undesirable knowledge transfers if 
governance mechanisms fail; 
Undesirable reputational transfers 
consequent upon counterfeiting; 
Blurring of IP ownership boundaries 
through supplier integration. 
Blurring of trademark scope in 
integrated supply networks. 
Product Traceability  
Traceability and authenticity 
problems avoided via the use of 
RFID technology. 
Counterfeiters’ capacities to replicate 
the technology, and the way in which 
re-packaging rules defeat such 
measures in international supply 
chains. 
End-of-Life Issues 
Environmental harm avoided by 
reverse logistics or closed-loop 
supply chain management. 
Counterfeiters’ sourcing from end-of-
life sources, and counterfeiting 
opportunities in end-of-type-life 
situations. 
Offshoring 
Lack of observability and  
opportunistic supplier behavior, such 
as IP theft; 
Opportunistic counterfeiting by 
suppliers; 
Technology appropriation and 
transfer to ‘pirate’ suppliers; 
Reputation appropriation by using 
trademark; 
Knowledge transfer problems 
avoided by ‘out-tasking’; 
Counterfeiting that involves no deep 
knowledge of the legitimate product; 
Patent infringement as an integrated 
international manufacturing network 
emerges, and as employees/skills 
become increasingly transient. 
Trademark infringement with 









Table II: Secondary Case Data Search Process - Number of Reports by Source and Stage of 
Data Reduction 
 
Search Results CIB FBI Nexis (NEX) Total 
 
All Search Results: No. of Reports 527* 525 230 1,282 
 
Non-duplicate Results 362 525 230 1,117 
 
Final Sample (which refer to cases) 71 30 26 127 
 
*  CIB search conducted twice with a 3-month intervening period to check stability; 
27 cases from the first search were not present in the second. 
 
 
Table III: Breakdown of Final Sample - Number of Reports by Source and Industry 
 
Industry (and Abbreviation) CIB FBI Nexis Total 
 
Pharmaceuticals (PHA) 25 2 20 47 
Automotive (AU) 9 1 0 10 
Electronics & Equipment (EL) 7 3 0 10 
Computer hard/software (CPU) 3 4 0 7 
Aerospace (AE) 4 2 0 6 
Luxury & Fashion Goods (LUX) 5 1 0 6 
Music & Movies (MUS) 1 5 0 6 
Currency & Minting (CUR) 0 5 0 5 
Food & Beverage (FOO) 5 0 0 5 
General* (GEN) 1 0 4 5 
Tobacco (TOB) 3 0 1 4 
Medical Equipment (MED) 2 1 0 3 
Legal Documents (LEG) 0 2 0 2 
Sporting Memorabilia (SPO) 1 1 0 2 
Transport (TRA) 1 1 0 2 
Construction (CON) 1 0 0 1 
Fine Art (FA) 0 1 0 1 
Hygiene Products (HYG) 0 0 1 1 
Marine (MAR) 1 0 0 1 
Oil & Gas (OIL) 0 1 0 1 
Satellite TV Subscription (SAT) 1 0 0 1 
Toys (TOY) 1 0 0 1 
 
Total 71 30 26 127 
 
*  ‘General’ cases present a broad argument on counterfeiting and include an insight 
into counterfeiting strategy with some cross-sectional reference to specific cases to 




Table IV: Extraction Strategies and Example Supporting Case Evidence 
 
 
*  Case references are based on data source, industry and case number within these categories: e.g. CIB-AE-4 is 
the 4th case from the CIB source referring to the aerospace industry. All further tables use the same convention. 
Extraction Strategy Evidence (Excerpt from Case) Case Reference * 
 
Recovery and overhaul of 
disposed genuine products 
‘The investigation led to a company in the US that 
dismantles old planes and sells on the spare parts. The 
FBI discovered that the parts were being bought and 
shipped to Ireland, where it is believed they may have 
been reconditioned and sold on as new.’ 
CIB-AE-4 
Theft and repackaging of 
components (e.g. from 
repair operations) 
‘Russian police intercepted and arrested a criminal 
group last month that they say illegally produced 
aircraft parts and sold them in Russia, as well as to 
other nations ... The organised group was arrested after 
allegedly stealing components from the Saturn plant in 
central Russia ...’ 
CIB-AE-3 
Acquisition of 
parts/products from an 
unsuspecting legitimate 
source  
‘... a private mint in Massachusetts had already made 
millions of the fake tokens and was almost ready to 
deliver another shipment. Mint officials said they 
didn’t realize the orders weren’t legit and cooperated 













Production Strategy Evidence (Excerpt from Case) Case Reference 
 
Produce for early market 
entry 
‘Counterfeiters with operations to rival manufacturing 
giants such as Gillette or Sony employ tens of thousands 
of people ... They send representatives to trade shows to 
collect samples of the latest goods and produce replicas, 
sometimes before the real thing hits the shops.’ 
NEX-GEN-3 
Postpone assembly of 
product and trademark  
‘The bag may be made in China, then shipped to another 
factory in Eastern Europe to have the signature Gucci or 
Christian Dior fittings attached to avoid detection, 
before being smuggled in small batches into the UK ... 
many factories employ illegal immigrants in sweatshops 
to make final additions to handbags.’ 
CIB-LUX-2 
Production over-run by 
subcontractor  
'Many western manufacturers have moved production to 
China, helping to lift the quality of the fakes. Some 
factories have been caught out producing genuine 
articles during the day and knocking out illegal copies at 
night.' 
NEX-GEN-2 
Parallel production of 
near-copies by 
subcontractor 
‘Some factories have a 'day shift' devoted to the 
production of genuine designer goods... followed by an 
illegal 'night shift' staffed by an entirely new batch of 
illegal workers and children who produce cheap replicas 
to be sold in markets across the globe.’ 
CIB-LUX-2 
Illicit subcontracting of a 
product to a cheaper 
producer 
‘Once they were awarded a contract for the aircraft 
parts, defendants [...] and [...] contacted unauthorized 
local manufacturers, including [...], to manufacture the 
parts, in violation of the specific contract specifications 
that required either new surplus parts or parts that had 
been manufactured by Boeing or other approved 
sources. Once the parts had been illegally manufactured, 
defendants [...] and [...] would complete false 
Certificates of Conformance, also known as a “Parts or 
Material Certification Form” or “ATA 106” forms, and 
other paperwork, including packing slips and invoices, 
all falsely representing either the condition or 
manufacturer of the parts.’ 
FBI-AE-1 
Dilution of genuine 
product  
'... forensic examinations of fake treatments have 
revealed toxic impurities such as anti-freeze and tiny 








Distribution Strategy Evidence (Excerpt from Case) Case Reference 
 
Ship via multiple ports 
and addresses  
‘From China, the fake medicines head west, typically 
passing through the transit point of Dubai, then the 
porous borders of Europe. Here the route becomes 
increasingly opaque. Intelligence reports from the 
medicines agency show that a single consignment of 
drugs can change hands up to 30 times before it 
reaches a British high-street chemist ...’ 
NEX-PHA-6 
Obscure trademark until 
close to customer 
‘[Genuine Producer’s] products are also being copied 
in Taiwan and other countries in East Asia. Mr. [...] 
showed the Subcommittee one pair of glasses (the 
genuine glasses are made in Austria) which bore on the 
temple piece a sticker which said, “Made in Taiwan, 
Republic of China.” However, when the label is 
removed, the legend “Made in Austria” is permanently 
engraved underneath. As Mr. [...] explained: “….as 
soon as they get into the United States, the stickers go 
off and it looks like the right product in the store.”’ 
CIB-LUX-3 
Over-produce and accept 
high attrition rates from 
seizures  
‘A syndicate can afford to lose four out of five 
container loads at frontier checks but the fifth with 
8.5m cigarettes that slips into the UK and sold at half 
the recommended price will net the criminals around 
£1.2m in profit.’ 
NEX-TOB-1 
Bundle counterfeit and 
genuine products 
together 
‘Last year the Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency issued a recall notice for a batch of 
[Legitimate Drug] ... It contained some active 
ingredient, but the fakers had made illegal inhalers and 
dosage counters - meaning patients could receive 
incorrect quantities.’ 
NEX-PHA-1 
Using a legitimate 
service provider or 
credible location  
‘... They then used the U.S. mail and other private 
commercial carriers to distribute the counterfeit 















parallel markets  
'More than 140 million medicine packs are parallel-traded like this 
every year ... an estimated 90 per cent of Britain's pharmacies have 
some product that has come via parallel trade ... On their journey 
around Europe, medicines can change hands 20 to 30 times. 
Because the original packaging and inserts are often in foreign 
languages, packs and literature are changed. The vast majority of 
drugs that enter Britain the parallel-trade route are repackaged. 






‘The counterfeits ... are being sold at outdoor markets, car boot 





media (e.g. via 
the Internet) 
'The investigation began when engine parts in US Air Force plants 
were found to be counterfeit. Contractors had bought the parts 
from an internet site run by an Irish company, but when they 







‘The price, 20 yuan a bottle, was cheap and he bought 50 bottles. 








‘Significant changes since the 1990s have led the military to move 
toward commercial manufacturers for parts, unfortunately granting 
counterfeiters a new way in. Because the military "has moved 
away from mil-spec components and now relies almost exclusively 
on commercial manufacturers for parts," it's even easier for 
counterfeiters to pass off uncertified products as the real deal, 
Military and Aerospace Electronics reported ...’ 
CIB-AE-1 
Passing off a 
legitimate 
supplier’s 
product as the 
OEM’s 
‘”... Genuine Toyota parts can only be bought from Toyota 
Uganda," the company says in adverts running in various media. 
However, this campaign did not go down well with other dealers 
who say they too sell original parts. [...], the managing director of 
[Dealer Name], said counterfeits are increasing and posing a threat 
to the industry, but refuted the assertion that Toyota Uganda was 





Table VIII: What Counterfeiters were doing with Respect to Signals 
Action Explanation Example Case Reference 
 
Transmitting 
Sending some signal 
deliberately or 
inadvertently 
‘[the defendants] ... conspired in a counterfeiting scheme to manufacture and 
sell oilfield pipe couplings stamped with a certification mark owned and 
registered by the American Petroleum Institute (API), without a license or 
authorization to do so ... profited at the expense of customers by 
manufacturing many of those couplings using substandard materials.’ 
FBI-OIL-1 
Obscuring 
Hiding or suppressing 
some signal that would 
otherwise be sent 
‘Customs only catches 2% of the fakes. Instead of people trying to smuggle 
bags over the border in mass quantities, they are selling it over the internet in 
single shipments. Customs obviously can't catch that.’ 
CIB-LUX-1 
Acting on 
Acting on some signal 
not necessarily directed 
at counterfeiters 
‘The current boom in the construction industry and the increasing height of 
buildings mean crane hire companies have come under extreme pressure to get 
more crane sections - a demand crane manufacturers are struggling to meet.’ 
CIB-CON-1 
Exploiting 
Exploiting some signal 
intended or exchanged 
among other actors 
‘India lacks the investigative bodies to carry out accident and fatality analysis 




Ignoring some signal 
directed at 
counterfeiters 
‘A syndicate can afford to lose four out of five container loads at frontier 
checks but the fifth with 8.5m cigarettes that slips into the UK and sold at half 






Table IX: What the Signals Concerned 
Object Explanation Example Case Reference 
 
Authenticity 
Signals about how 
genuine a product or 
producer is 
‘The box was an exact copy; the lenses contain [genuine producer’s] 
registered trademark and its logo; and there was even a false registration 
number inside the box. The Brazilian pirate even brazenly included a post card 
with which the unsuspecting consumer could register the false serial number 
with the company.’ 
CIB-LUX-3 
Quality 
Signals about the 
quality, performance or 
the reliability of 
products 
‘Fraudsters want to avoid detection and keep their customers returning. Selling 
dud or harmful products is not in their interests. In the five cases so far 
detected in which counterfeit drugs have reached the NHS [National Health 




information that would 
allow counterfeiters to 
be traced 
‘...original spam messages originated from an address licensed to someone in 
Russia, the website server was in China, the credit card payee phone number 
was in the UK, the card payment was processed in Australia and the drugs 
were mailed from Chicago.’ 
NEX-PHA-8 
Organisation 
Signals about the 
presence and operation 
of organised 
counterfeiting  
‘'Customs only catches 2% of the fakes. Instead of people trying to smuggle 
bags over the border in mass quantities, they are selling it over the internet in 
single shipments. Customs obviously can't catch that.'’ 
CIB-LUX-1 
Destination 
Signals about the 
destination of legitimate 
materials in counterfeit 
products 
‘In October 2005, a U.S. token broker reported that someone wanted to order 
two million of the Toronto tokens. The customer said that the tokens would be 
thrown from floats during a holiday parade in the Caribbean and that he 
wanted them delivered to Niagara Falls, New York ... After talking with the 
token broker, Gross learned that a private mint in Massachusetts had already 
made millions of the fake tokens and was almost ready to deliver another 
shipment. Mint officials said they didn’t realize the orders weren’t legit ...’ 
FBI-TRA-1 
Accessibility Signals about the ease of access to a market 
‘Significant changes since the 1990s have led the military to move toward 
commercial manufacturers for parts, unfortunately granting counterfeiters a 
new way in. Because the military "has moved away from mil-spec 
components and now relies almost exclusively on commercial manufacturers 
for parts," it's even easier for counterfeiters to pass off uncertified products as 
the real deal, Military and Aerospace Electronics reported in mid-July 2007.’ 
CIB-AE-1 
Demand Signals about the need ‘Because many aerospace systems and components are designed to last a long CIB-AE-1 
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or desire for some 
product or service 
time, it can be difficult to procure the same part from a manufacturer to 
replace the original — a dilemma that makes aerospace applications an 
especially desirable target for counterfeiters ... because of part unavailability 
from the original manufacturer, many industries find they must turn to 
independent distributors.’ 
Availability 
Signals about the 
availability of some 
product 
‘[...] and [...] created various eBay merchant accounts and other commercial 
Web sites from which to sell and distribute greatly discounted counterfeit 
software. The pair, doing business as SoftwareDiner.com, 
Thesoftwareyard.com, Argyleequity.com, Eagletronics.com, Tekdealer.com, 
and other business names, advertised on Internet listings that they were 
authorized distributors of numerous brand name software from legitimate 
companies.’ 
FBI-CPU-2 
Recourse Signals about recourse to the producer  
‘[...], 49, used his MSH World Traders website to drum up business from 
people suffering from sexual dysfunction.  Many of his customers quickly 
realised they had been duped but were too embarrassed to complain.’ 
NEX-PHA-4 
Jurisdiction 
Signals about regional 
differences and 
discontinuities in law 
and standards 
‘Thus ended the worst ever counterfeiting scam of its kind in Canada … a 
crime that was enabled here in the U.S. “The fact is, law enforcement has to 
respect borders but criminals don’t.”’ 
FBI-TRA-1 
Penalty 
Signals about the 
punishment or sanctions 
for counterfeiting 
‘[...] could not even be charged with manufacturing the illegal substances, 
because under law he had not "produced" anything, but simply altered the way 







Table X: Counter-Measures to the Counterfeiting Strategies Identified 








Recovery and overhaul 
of disposed genuine 
products 
Stopping the flow of end-of-life, stolen, and legitimately acquired (but destined for counterfeits) 
materials and products by: 
• Re-acquiring obsolete products, incentivising returns by customers and meeting the costs of 
returns 
• Requiring destruction of obsolete products and components, incentivising destruction, e.g. 
by paying for certificates of destruction or destroyed items, and providing resources for 
destruction processes 
• Informing inadvertent suppliers of counterfeiters and incentivising them not to supply 
counterfeiters, paying for intelligence from suppliers, and designing appropriate and 
perhaps exclusive supply contracts  
• In-sourcing the production of particularly critical materials 
• Incorporating the potential for ‘leakage’ in the supplier selection process 
• Avoiding the over-rapid discontinuation of product lines 
Making acquired materials and products useless for counterfeiting by: 
• Undermining physical functions and appearance, e.g. after a certain shelf life 
• Making it costly for counterfeiters to change marks and labels that would show components 
and materials have been in prior use 
Theft and repackaging of 
components (e.g. from 
repair operations) 
Acquisition of 









Production over-run by 
subcontractor  Dealing with failures of agency in the supply chain by: 
• Designing contracts that prohibit dealings with counterfeiters 
• Enforcing contracts with closer personal relationships, auditing and monitoring 
• Incentivising conformant behaviour, such as by paying for intelligence about counterfeits 
• Providing suppliers with strict quantities of materials and components just in time 
• Forbidding unauthorised subcontracting by suppliers  
Parallel production of 
near-copies by 
subcontractor 
Illicit subcontracting of a 
product to a cheaper 
producer 
Produce for early market 
entry 
Informing the market by: 
• Creating market expectations that counterfeits are in circulation  
Creating activation requirements that increase counterfeiters’ costs by: 
• Requiring codes, passwords or keys that activate the product after the market entry date 
Avoiding the over-regular introduction of new products 
Postpone assembly of 
product and trademark  
Sharing intelligence with customs and trading authorities; but, otherwise, this is beyond the 
legitimate supply chain’s influence 
Dilution of genuine 
product  
Communicating the potential for dilution to customers and consumers  
For experience products, making dilution physically costly or impossible by: 









Ship via multiple ports 
and addresses  
Sharing intelligence with customs and trading authorities; but, otherwise, this is beyond the 
legitimate supply chain’s influence  
Obscure trademark until 
close to customer 
Over-produce and accept 
high attrition rates from 
seizures  
Bundle counterfeit and 
genuine products 
together 
Undermining the false credibility of the counterfeiter’s distribution process by: 
• Informing potential customers of the possibility 
• Educating customers how to differentiate between genuine and counterfeit products 
• Informing and negotiating with other supply chain actors like logistics providers (alerting 
them to specific cues, e.g. divided consignments) and accessory distributors, alerting them 
to relevant cues, e.g. bulk buying of accessories 
Using a legitimate 
service provider or 








Infiltration of parallel 
markets 
 
Raising risk awareness and knowledge among potential consumers by: 
• Admitting your products are being counterfeited 
• Explaining the consequences of consuming counterfeits 
• Educating consumers about different channels, their characteristics and how to authenticate 
them 
• Educating consumers about how to differentiate between genuine and counterfeit products 
• Developing distinctive and hard-to-imitate packaging 
• Developing packaging that is frequently changed and can be authenticated in real time 
Dealing with market institutions by: 
• Lobbying for more rigorous counterfeit controls, e.g. controls on auction websites 
Designing market and product strategies in anticipation of counterfeiting by: 
• Recognising that segmentation in free trade areas leads to parallel importing and thereby 
facilitates the infiltration of counterfeits 
• Recognising that setting high prices incentivises counterfeiting further 
Retail via informal 
markets 
Using impersonal media 
(e.g. via the Internet) 
Recruiting an otherwise 
legitimate retailer or 
wholesaler 
Controlling supply chains more effectively: 
• In-sourcing and vertical integration 
• Providing suppliers with strict quantities of materials and components just in time 
• Incentivising actors to report rather than collaborate with counterfeiters 
• Communicating risk to after-market consumers especially, informing them about high-risk 
channels and authentication tests 
Injection into less-
controlled maintenance 
& repair after-markets 
Passing off a legitimate 






































Recovery and overhaul of disposed genuine products 
Theft and repackaging of components (e.g. from repair operations) 
Acquisition of parts/products from an unsuspecting legitimate source  
Production strategies 
Produce for early market entry 
Postpone assembly of product and trademark 
Production over-run by subcontractor  
Parallel production of near-copies by subcontractor 
Illicit subcontracting of a product to a cheaper producer  
Dilution of genuine product  
 
Infiltration strategies 
Infiltration of parallel markets  
Retail via informal markets 
Using impersonal media (e.g. via the Internet) 
Recruiting an otherwise legitimate retailer or wholesaler 
Injection into less-controlled maintenance & repair after-markets  
Passing off a legitimate supplier’s product as the OEM’s  
Distribution strategies 
Ship via multiple ports and addresses  
Obscure trademark until close to customer  
Over-produce and accept high attrition rates from seizures  
Bundle counterfeit and genuine products together  
Using a legitimate distributor or credible location 
Likely goals of counterfeiters 
 
Maximise revenues (e.g.) 
 Maximise credibility of product and source 
 
Minimise detection probability (e.g.) 
 Minimise visibility of production 
 Maximise authenticity of appearance 
 Minimise suspiciousness of consignments 
 
Minimise enforcement penalties (e.g.) 






































Value of producer’s quality resource 
Time 
Value of producer’s trademark resource 

































Signal type key: spacing between arrows in the diagram denotes likely time density of signaling 
Product quality  Threat alert/sanction Obscured/hidden signal  False signal  
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
J 
K 
F G 
H 
I 
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